Assessing the Surge
Some correspondents are gleefully promoting Bush’s surge of troops in Iraq as a success. Some newspaper opinion writers were claiming success when the surge had only begun. Their metric? A reduction in violent deaths throughout the country. While cause for optimism, a reduction in violence is hardly something to brag about.
Adding U.S. troops in early 2007 may have cut sectarian slaughter, but putting U.S. troops in Iraq in early 2003 is what started the wave of violence in the first place. What’s more, the surge was not intended merely to reduce violence. The surge was supposed to give the Iraqi government time to get its act together. Which begs the question: What Iraqi government?
Turkey is openly running ground and air attacks against Kurdish enclaves across its border with Iraq. Is the Iraqi government screaming bloody murder at this violation of Iraq’s borders? No, and the reason is simple. Beyond the Green Zone the Iraqi government has no cohesive power and very little credibility. Iraq’s population is mostly Shiite, and what national government exists is controlled by Shiites. The Sunni minority ran the country for decades, and constituted most of its army. After almost four years of training, the so-called Iraqi Army is so dysfunctional we are cutting deals with warlords.
L. Paul Bremer, with the passive acquiescence of the American government, disbanded the Iraqi army, creating an overnight insurgency aimed at getting us out of the country. Shiite militias targeted Sunnis for reprisal after decades of repression. Then another player entered the field, al-Qaeda in Iraq, another Sunni force with its own political and religious agenda. Unable to blame Sunnis and Shiites, who were after all only doing what Sunnis and Shiites have been doing for centuries, the U.S. decided al-Qaeda in Iraq was the Big Problem.
Unable to whip up a viable Iraqi Army, the U.S. decided to make nice with Sunni insurgents (most of them ex-Iraqi Army, who only days before had been attacking coalition forces) in al-Qaeda controlled areas. Sleeping with the enemy, as it were. The same tactic we employed in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, leading directly to the eruption of al-Qaeda. Our new best friends in the Sunni militias are no friends to the Shiite government, which justifiably fears them. Once again, to solve a short-term problem we created many long-term problems.
Iraqi insurgencies may be docile now, but their spirit is strong. Elsewhere (remember Afghanistan?), where we looked away, al-Qaeda is on the rebound. We’re facing opponents with deep-seated religious and ethnic commitment. One lesson we failed to learn in Vietnam is that such insurgencies are patient. The Vietnam War spanned five American presidencies, and the other side ultimately won. Rather than being defeated, al-Qaeda in Iraq may be biding its time.
Readers of the old Birds of a Feather forum may recall our discussions about the near impossibility of establishing a non-authoritarian government in Iraq. At the time I likened it to the Balkans, former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia appeared peaceful because Tito ruled with an iron hand. Tito’s death popped the cork, and decades of resentment exploded in violence.
We’re tempted to say, “Why can’t they (Iraqis) all just get along?” This sentiment misses a very important point. Shiites and Sunnis see each other as nothing less than apostates. To hard-liners in one sect, the other sect is barely more acceptable than Jews or Christians. (Some American “Christian” politicians are trying to push this country in the same direction, and we shouldn’t ignore the threat.)
The first business of a government is to maintain order. Given the chaos wreaked by our mismanaged invasion, that would be a hard job for any government. Given Iraq’s history and religious constituency, it is nearly impossible, as we can see. We can’t sustain current troop levels, much less the number needed to maintain order for the years it will take to establish a credible Iraqi government. Nor will any obviously U.S.-supported Iraqi government ever look like anything more than a puppet regime. Republics are fought for and built by citizens, not imagined and imposed by outsiders.
We may not like what happens in Iraq in the future, but Iraqis don’t like what we’ve made happen to them now. I doubt there is a single Iraqi who doesn’t resent what we’ve done to the country. Whatever party ultimately controls Iraq will have to distance itself from the United States, or be branded another puppet. As we should have learned from Vietnam, our continued occupation only prolongs their suffering and ours, and will not change the outcome.
That Iraq failed to make sustainable gains from the surge is no surprise. The Shiite majority underdogs had no experience in governance. Leadership is not a skill learned overnight, and too many Shia harbor too many grudges against the Sunnis. (It doesn’t help a bit that they’re taking advice from theocratic Shiite Iran, either. Another obvious outcome no one in the Bush regime could foresee.)
It may be that the entire current adult generation of Iraqis has to pass, taking their anger and resentment with them to the grave, before Iraq can form a stable, just government. Or it may be that only a strongman government like Tito’s or Saddam’s can maintain order. In the meantime we can expect many years of violence.
The best we can do is limit arms flow into the country, and also inhibit the flow of suicidal maniacs from other countries. Meanwhile, we’ll have to let the Iraqis fight it out, until one or both sides are simply too tired to fight any longer. This will be the shameful legacy of the Bush Administration, the most dishonorable group of people to ever disgrace our government.